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Specialists at Fryazino

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1. Although attempts were made to influence politically the German specialists working at Institute [REDACTED] do not believe that the Soviets felt that they could convert [REDACTED] group into Communists. Although [REDACTED] they did not resent [REDACTED] reluctance to embrace Marxist doctrines, there were two points about which the Soviets made no compromise: the existence of Soviet-German friendship and the USSR's love of peace. 25X1
2. Until the spring of 1948, no pressure was exerted on the Germans to acquaint themselves with the political theories of the USSR. The German group, under the leadership of Drs. Steimel and Spiegel, had organized themselves to some degree, but their organization was not political. (Of the members of [REDACTED] group, Storm was concerned with receiving [REDACTED] newspapers and mail, Pederzani with supervising the living quarters, Coehnen with wages and social benefits, Dr. Schaaff with ration cards, Zimmerman acted as the representative of the non-academic German employees, etc.) In the spring of 1948, the SED (Socialist Unity Party) tried to organize a political group among the German specialists. Schoen, Coehnen, and Balentin prevailed upon the Soviet management of the Institute to organize a lecture course for the Germans which would treat the development and doctrines of Bolshevik Communism. The lectures, which were held every two weeks, proved to be a failure. The Soviet speaker did not present his ideas on Soviet Communism but merely read from a book written by Stalin. Questions or discussions were not permitted. This effort dwindled within a short time because it was boring. 25X1

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3. Undaunted, the SED then wanted to proceed with the organization of a German union. The Soviets initially did not seem to object, and the SED members began to set up a charter, distribute membership cards, and plan a great celebration for 1 May 1949. The Soviets, however, much to the delight of most of the Germans in [] group, then forbade the forming of the specialists' union as well as the 1 May celebration. Meanwhile, the Soviets had started another project for [] indoctrination. Officers in uniforms ([] the uniforms had gold shoulder boards) gave monthly lectures about the international situation. The officers spoke excellent German and seemed to be very well informed. Their approach to the topic was based on the Soviet attempt to create peace in the world. These lectures were fairly well attended because they broke the monotony of [] life, and because some [] were genuinely interested in the Soviet point of view and international events, even though the presentations were colored. 25X1
4. At about the same time, the Soviets nominated Schoen, an SED member, to represent the German group in their negotiations. [] Schoen felt that his new position necessitated some action on his part and he began to form a cultural committee. He was careful to camouflage his political desires by securing the help of people who did not belong to the party. The unsuspecting scientists agreed to participate in the cultural activities--until they found out that these were SED-inspired and refused to cooperate further. But now Coehnen, who had been nominated cultural representative of the German group by the Soviets, attempted to form a group. His approach was non-political. He proposed numerous cultural activities, among which was a 1 May 50 celebration. Although Schoen's previous activities had been silently boycotted by the Germans, the 1 May celebration led to a formal protest from the German group--which resulted in the complete collapse of his new organization. 25X1
5. After 1 May 50 a new cultural committee was formed which was active until the time of a speech by Gusinskiy (head of electronics union) in the summer of 1950. After this speech the Germans attacked Gusinskiy and the USSR for bad faith in keeping them in the USSR and for distorting the truth about conditions in other lands. This angered Gusinskiy but instead of punishing the Germans, as was expected and feared, he sent a Mrs. Pipko to them. This Mrs Pipko, undoubtedly a member of the MVD, was a person of great charm and skill. Conversant with practically any subject of art (she knew German literature well), she was also a great source of personal help to the German scientists and their families. She helped the women knit, cook, plan shopping trips to Moscow, etc. (Although she occasionally permitted [] shopping in Moscow without her, [] always under Soviet surveillance.) 25X1
6. In addition to Mrs Pipko's attempt to raise the morale of the German group, she was also instrumental in organizing another cultural committee--suggesting that Drs Steimel, Schaaff, and Gerlach take over its management and thereby assure its success. She saw to it that a club-house was placed at [] disposal for meetings and then secured distinguished speakers [] Nikolaus Jansen, the chief of the German broadcasting program of the Moscow station, was the first speaker. He spoke German with a clear East Prussian accent; his manner impressed [] very much. He spoke about Marxism and dialectical materialism 25X1

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on a very academic level; and, although he may not have convinced anyone of the truth of the Marxist doctrine, he fascinated his listeners by his skillful phrasing and by the apparent honesty which he displayed in admitting mistakes made by the Soviet policy. He defined the difference between a democracy, a peoples' democracy, and the Soviet Union. He pointed out that these represent three stages of political maturation, in that a democracy has more than one party because the people are not ready to operate the state without the help of a conservative group of intellectual leaders-- which, however, will disappear in time. The peoples' democracy has eliminated the bourgeois parties, but is not yet organized along the Soviet system of rule by councils and collectives. The conversion into a collective state is in progress, but still incomplete. The Soviet Union is the highest type of political body to date, but the ultimate goal even in the USSR, ie, the classless society, is not yet reached and cannot be reached as long as the pressure from abroad continues to be as strong as it is, a result of the present political condition of the world. In his last lecture, in the summer of 1951, Jansen emphasized the fact that he would not address [] again until [] some efforts to understand the principles of Marxist and affiliated doctrines. Another speaker whom Mrs Pipko hired [] was Spiro, a professor of history at the University of Moscow who had left the University of Vienna during the disturbances in Vienna in 1934. [] found him very disagreeable because of his unmitigated hatred for Germans.

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7. To meet Mr Jansen's challenge, Dr Steimel organized an indoctrination course for the German group. Jansen, whose four or five lectures had laid the groundwork for [] Marxist understanding, was to be followed by various members of [] group who were to give weekly speeches. Steimel, however, was careful to avoid permitting extemporaneous speeches by the individual speakers; he simply directed that they secure the Marxist literature pertaining to the chosen topic and read excerpts from it. In this way he protected himself and the other Germans, because no statement could be made in this way that might be challenged by the Soviets. (A lecture was challenged once, however; a colleague was speaking about the ancient Persians and their relations to the slaves. He pointed out that the slaves in the Persian society were specialists of conquered countries who were used and exploited by the conquerors, and were leading a reasonably normal life except that they were never permitted to go about without supervision. At that point, one of the Soviets interrupted and wanted to stop the lecture, but the German showed him that he was quoting Engels' "History of the Family".) Steimel was the only speaker who did not merely read []. He was extremely skillful in his presentations, first pointing out a fact and then clothing it with the Marxist theories that would be acceptable to the Soviets. For example, he cited the management-worker relations existing in the Ford plants (the Ford empire, of course, typifying capitalism), and then asserted that this system was not one that had been initiated by Ford but one that had been devised in the USSR and subsequently adopted and distorted by Ford. For each statement of fact (which might well have been unpalatable to the Soviets) he offered another which reflected how 'misguided' people had abused the basic concept. Steimel thereby saved face with the Soviets and gave [] a chance to see both sides of the picture. Steimel's tactics

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met with silent amusement on the part of the Germans and often nearly resulted in his being disciplined by the Soviets. This lecture program, begun in the fall of 1951, was active until [redacted] April 1952. Most Germans attended only occasionally and some never (a practice that was hazardous because of the Soviets' sporadic attendance checks). One [redacted] wanted to start another group, "Pioneers", the Soviet equivalent of the Cub Scouts, but this effort collapsed after a few meetings.

8. [redacted] forced to sign the Stockholm Peace Appeal twice-- [redacted]

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[redacted] Early in 1948, Kischkov, the chief of the Personnel Department, requested that [redacted] sign another paper which stated that [redacted] promised not to divulge the nature of [redacted] activities in the USSR, and that [redacted] would inform against any colleague that did. When [redacted] refused to sign this document, [redacted] threatened with deportation to Omsk.

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